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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAw-NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIME AND DEFENSES IN
GENERAL-ENTRAPMENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL PRosEcuTioN.-Defendant

was convicted of receiving, concealing and selling opium. The only proof of
guilt was the testimony of an informer employed by the United States Bureau
of Narcotics. Defendant and the informer became acquainted while both
were undergoing medical treatment to rid themselves of drug addiction.
Subsequently the defendant, at the informer's repeated requests, purchased
drugs which he delivered to the infonner. After several sales, defendant was
arrested by government officers in the execution of a prearranged plan based
on information obtained by the informer. The only defense offered was that
the defendant had been induced to commit the offense by the' informer and
was therefore entrapped. The court held that the charge of the trial judge,
in which he told the jury that the law did not permit a government agent to
trick anyone into committing a criime through artifice or fraud, was erroneous.
Artifice or fraud was not a necessary element of the defense of entrapment.
United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Entrapment" is the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated
by him, for the sole purpose of instituting criminal prosecution against him.,
Where it is proved that the defendant did not originate the idea of committing
the specified offense or any similar crime and the officer, by persuasion and
representation, induced the defendant's act, entrapment is a good defense.2
The first duty of an officer of the law is to prevent, not punish, crime and
a conviction for an offense induced by officers of the government which
did not originate in the mind of the defendant will not be sustained.3 There
is a clear distinction between measures used to make a person a criminal in
order to secure a conviction and the use of artifice by officers in gathering
evidence to prosecute and convict a person suspected of being engaged in
criminal practice. 4 "If the criminal intent or the willing pisposition to commit
the crime originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is
completed, the fact that the opportunity is furnished or the accused is
aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary
to prosecute him for it constitutes no defense."5 If the authorities have
1. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1,
89 A.2d 219 (1952); State v. Jarvis, 105 W.Va. 499, 143 S.E. 235 (1928).
2. Capuano v. United States, 9 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1925); Butts v. United States,
273 Fed. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921); State v. McCornish, 59 Utah 58, 201 Pac. 637 (1921).

3. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932);

United States ex. rel. Hassel v.

Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1927); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th
Cir. 1921).
4. United States ex. rel. Hassel v. Mathues, 22 F. 2d 979 (4th Cir. 1927); State v.
Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d (1952); Lee v. State, 66 Okla. Cr. 399, 92 P.2d
621, 624 (1939).
5. State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A-2d 219, 221; United States v. Perkins, 190
F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951) (defense of entrapment not available where officers furnished

former inmate of House of Correction with money to buy drugs from defendant who

was also former inmate of same House); Schneider v. United States, 192 F.2d 498, 502
(9th Cir. 1951) (evidence held insuffiaient to show entrapment where defendant bought
scrap iron from the United States Government, and an army Lieutenant, at the suggestion
of an officer of the F.B.I., acceded to defendant's plan to take more salvage than was
originally purchased); Hunter v. United States, 62 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1932) "In
cases where the intention to violate the law originates in the mind of the defendant, and
the government agents or representatives do no more than merely to afford him an
opportunity to commit a crime, in order to make out a case which can be successfully
prosecuted, there is no entrapment.. The government agents may even go so far as to
aid in the commission of the crime without affecting the right of prosecution."; Patton
v. United States, 42 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1930) (where defendant paid federal prohibition
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reasonable grounds to suspect the actused of planning a crime and an officer
joins the defendant for the purpose of detecting such crime and prosecuting
the criminal, the officer's act would not prevent a conviction. One of two
conditions, however, must be present to warrant a conviction. There must
be either: (1) A reasonable suspicion on the part of the officers that the
party is engaged in the commission of, or is about to commit a crime; or
(2), the original suggestion or initiative for the perpetration of the offense
must come from the suspect.6 The defense of entrapment is, however, a
positive defense with the burden of proof on the defendant to show that
he was entrapped.7 Although decoys may be used to entrap criminals, and
to present an opportunity to one willing to commit a crime, the entrapment
would not be permissible if decoys are used to ensnare the innocent and law
abiding into commission of a crime. When the criminal design is conceived
in the mind of an officer and the defendant is lured into its commission, the
government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecuting," it being
the co'rt',s position that they will not permit their process to be used in aid
of a scheme for the creation of crime by those whose duty it is to prevent
its commission. 9 The vital factor in determining if there has been an illegal
entrapment is whether the accused was induced by the persuasion of the
government agent to participate in a crime which he would not otherwise
have committed. 10 Any effective appeal made by agents to impulses of
compassion, sympathy, pity, friendship, fear or hope other than the expectation
of gain and profit raises the defense of entrapment."' In order to rebut such
a defense, officers may present evidence to show that the defendant has
engaged in other transactions of a like nature. 12 If the defendant has been
engaged in criminal conduct similar to that with which he is charged and has
already formed designs to commit similar crimes, or has proved willingness
to commit the crime, such willingness being evinced by his ready compliance,
the defense of entrapment may not be valid even if officers design and

agents to protect him in his violation of the National Prohibition Act, the jury found
no entrapment); Newman v. United States. 299 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1924) (where
federal agent went to the office of the defendant, a physician, and told him that he
was an addict and bought drugs, the defense of entrapment was a question for the jury).
6. Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1921); United States v.
C-rtain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquor, 290 Fed. 824, 826 (D. N.H. 1923).
7. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932); People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App.2d
99, 48 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1935); "The burden of persuasion cannot be shifted in such
a manner as to relieve the prosecution of its duty of convincing the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, however." Wigmore, Evidence 112512. 2514 (3d ed. 1940).
8. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 4.59 (1932) (concurring opinion) "The
applicable principle is that courts must be closed to .the trial of a crime instigated by
the government's own agents. No other issue, no comparison of equities as between the
guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in the enforcement of this overiding
prinieple of public policy."; United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2nd Cir. 1933);
State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219 (1952).
9. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); O'Brian v. United States, 51 F.2d
674 (7th Cir. 1931); State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1. 89 A.2d 219, 221 (1952).
10. Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d 386, 394 (9th Cir. 1953); State v. Marquardt,
139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219, 221 (1952).
11. Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933); Hunter v. United States, 62
F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1932) (agent registered as a guest at a hotel appealed to
defendant to get him a half gallon of good whiskey to cure mother who was sick with flu),
United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 163 (D. Neb. 1927).
12. Sauvain v. United States, 31 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1929); Nutter v. United States,
289 Fed. 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1923).
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provoke the particular crime charged.13 There is dictunl to the effect that
even if the defendant is in the course of committing a crime of some kind,
has already formed the design to engage in it, or is suspected with good
reason, it is a good defense if the officer instigated the crime."
The test
turns upon the issue of inducement. "If the accused entertained the criminal
intent before he was afforded the opportunity to violate the law, he is in no
position to plead estoppel." 35 Although there has been no recent opportunity
for the courts of North Dakota to decide the issue of entrapment, they have
in the past laid down a rule which is in accord with the general rule here
stated.i1 The instant case laid. down no new or arbitrary rules concerning
entrapment but was content to accept the law as determined in previous
litigation before Federal courts. In the light of holdings in other recent cases,
the decision of the court seems sound. An officer may ttse trickery or artifice
to test a suspected person by offering him an opportunity to transgress, but
may not put himiunder extraordinary temptation."; Such artifice or trickery
is not necessary to a good defense however,' and the grant of a new trial
because of an instruction to the jury naming such conditions as a prerequisite
to acquittal is not contrary to existing law.
BAYARD
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Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a pinball machine installed in
his restaurant was not a gambling device and an injunction prohibiting
enforcement officials from arresting plaintiff, confiscating his machine, or
interfering with its operation and use. The District Court entered judgment
for the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a
pinball machine which gave a free game or games upon the attainment of a
certain minimum score, but in the operation of which the element of chance
predominated over that of skill, was a game of chance played for money, and
its use prohibited. Baedaro v. Caldwell, 56 N.W.2d 706 (Neb. 1953).
The constitutionality of statutes providing for the confiscation of gambling
devices is almost uniformly upheld., The problem of primary importance in
13. United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1951) (defendant not illegally
entrapped where former inmate of House of Correction was given money by an officer
for the purpose of buying drugs and he induced defendant, also a former member of
same House who recognized him, to procure the drugs); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d
1007 (2nd Cir. 1933) (where the defendant was regularly distributing obscence matter,

the fact that postal inspectors induced him to ship such matter in interstate commerce
for the purpose of prosecuting him, did not constitute an illegal entrapment); United
States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 Fed. 824, 826 (D.N.H. 1923)
"In the absence of special circumstances excusing it, a person who, at the suggestion or
instigation of another, commits a crime not particularly affecting an individual in person
or property, is just as guilty as though the design had originated with him, and this is
true, though the suggestion came from an officer of the law."
14. See United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2nd Cir. 1933).
15. State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219, 222 (1952).
16. State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655, 102 N.W. 875 (1905).
17. United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925); Sutton v. State, 59" Ga.
App. 198, 200 S.E. 225 (1938); State v. Boylan, 158 Minn. 263, 197 N.W. 281 (1924).
18. Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596, 599 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1953).
1. League for Preservation of Civil Rights and Internal Tranquility v. City of Cincinnati,
64 Ohio App. 195, 28 N.E.2d 660 (1940); see People v. One Pinball Machine, 316 I11.
App. 161. 44 N.E.2d 950, 952 (1942).

